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Who invests in training if contracts are
temporary? Empirical evidence for Germany
using selection correction∗
Abstract
This study deals with the eﬀect of ﬁxed-term contracts on work-related training.
Though previous studies found a negative eﬀect of ﬁxed-term contracts on the par-
ticipation in training, from the theoretical point of view it is not clear whether
workers with ﬁxed-term contracts receive less or more training, compared to work-
ers with permanent contracts. In addition to the existing strand of literature, we
especially distinguish between employer- and employee-ﬁnanced training in order
to allow for diverging investment patterns of worker and ﬁrm. Using data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we estimate a bivariate probit model
to control for selection eﬀects that may arise from unobservable factors, aﬀecting
both participation in training and holding ﬁxed-term contracts. Finding negative
eﬀects for employer-sponsored, as well as for employee-sponsored training, leads us
to conclude that workers with ﬁxed-term contracts do not compensate for lower ﬁrm
investments.
Keywords: training, ﬁxed-term contracts, bivariate probit model
JEL-Codes: C35, J24, J42
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Zusammenfassung
¨ Ahnlich zu anderen europ¨ aischen L¨ andern wurde die Nutzung von befristeten
Besch¨ aftigungsverh¨ altnissen in Deutschland seit den 1980ern durch verschiedene
Reformen vereinfacht. Im Gegensatz zu unbefristeten Besch¨ aftigungsverh¨ altnissen,
enden befristete Besch¨ aftigungsverh¨ altnisse mit dem Ende der Laufzeit, wodurch
keine institutionellen K¨ undigungskosten entstehen. Obwohl die Nutzung der
Befristung insgesamt relativ gering ist, ist gerade bei neu eingegangenen Besch¨ afti-
gungsverh¨ altnissen der Anteil der Befristung hoch. Trotz positiver Aspekte
befristeter Besch¨ aftigungsverh¨ altnisse wie der Senkung der Anpassungskosten
und Screening, k¨ onnen befristete Besch¨ aftigungsverh¨ altnisse auch zu geringeren
Aufstiegschancen oder unsicheren Erwerbsverl¨ aufe f¨ uhren. Ein weiterer wichtiger
Punkt ist ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen Befristung und Investitionen
in beruﬂiche Weiterbildung. Um zudem Unterschiede im Investitionsverhalten
zwischen Arbeitgebern und (befristeten) Arbeitnehmern aufzudecken, werden
Sch¨ atzungen getrennt f¨ ur Arbeitgeber- und Arbeitnehmer-ﬁnanzierte Weiterbil-
dung durchgef¨ uhrt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass befristet Besch¨ aftigte weniger an
Weiterbildung partizipieren. Weil Teilnahme an Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen wie
auch die Befristung von unbeobachtbaren Faktoren beeinﬂusst werden kann, wird
f¨ ur Selektion kontrolliert.
Schlagw¨ orter: beruﬂiche Weiterbildung, befristete Besch¨ aftigungs-
verh¨ altnisse, bivariates Probit-Modell
JEL-Codes: C35, J24, J42
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1 Introduction
Similar to other European countries, the German legislation on ﬁxed-term employ-
ment has been deregulated since the 1980ies. In contrast to permanent contracts,
ﬁxed-term employment contracts end without dismissal at the end of the contract
period and thus lower institutional ﬁring costs. Though the overall use of ﬁxed-term
employment is still low, a remarkable share of all hirings are based on ﬁxed-term
contracts.1
At the same time, concerns have arisen relating to the increasing share of temporary
workers. It is argued that temporary work lowers upward job mobility and that
especially low-skilled temporary workers have lower transition rates to permanent
jobs. It is also argued that temporary workers are less satisﬁed with their jobs in
comparison to permanent workers. In addition, there is a negative nexus between
temporary work and work-related training.2 From the theoretical perspective it
is not clear why temporary workers receive less training compared to permanent
workers. Whilst most theories indicate lower ﬁrms’ investments in human capital
of temporary workers, temporary workers may have incentives to invest in human
capital themselves, e.g. to force the transition to permanent contracts.
In addition to the existing strand of literature on the inﬂuences of contract type
on investments in human capital, we especially distinguish between employer- and
employee-ﬁnanced training in order to allow diverging investment patterns of worker
and ﬁrm. Methodological, we control for selection to yield unbiased estimates, be-
cause training participation as well as holding a ﬁxed-term contract can be driven
by unobservable factors.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 summarises the
theory on work-related training and draws implications for training of workers with
ﬁxed-term contracts. Section 3 contains method, data and descriptive statistics,
estimation results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and previous empirical ﬁndings
Following the seminal study of Becker (1962; 1993), investments in human capi-
tal are categorised in general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Assuming perfect
labour markets, investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital are shared between em-
ployer and employee, depending on labour turnover (Hashimoto, 1981). Because
1 Hagen (2004, p. 110) notes that within West German private sector establishments between
1997-1999, 6.1% of all employees work on the basis of a ﬁxed-term contract, whereas it is
almost 43% of all hirings. See ﬁgure 1 for the development of ﬁxed-term employment, based
on the German Mikrozensus.
2 See Arulampalam and Booth (1998), Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2000), Wallette (2005),
OECD (2002), or Albert, Garc´ ıa-Serrano and Hernanz (2005).
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investments in general human capital increase the worker’s marginal product in all
ﬁrms and because perfect information is assumed, ﬁrms do not invest in general
human capital. Relaxing the assumption of perfect labour markets, recent theo-
retical models explain ﬁrms’ investments in general human capital by compressed
wages (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999).3 Intensely discussed reasons for compressed
wages are transaction costs (Acemoglu, 1997) and asymmetric information. The
latter occurs if incumbent ﬁrms have superior information about their employees’
human capital and training (Katz and Ziderman, 1990), or if “outside” ﬁrms ob-
serve training intensity, but not ability (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). Autor (2001)
models training choice by workers as a screening device that induces self-selection
of high-ability workers.4
Except for Autor’s model, theoretical models on investments in human capital do
not deal with ﬁxed-term contracts. However, there are arguments for positive, as
well as for negative, inﬂuences of ﬁxed-term contracts on investments in human
capital. First, expected job duration of ﬁxed-term workers is shorter compared to
workers with permanent contracts. Therefore, the discount period for employer’s
and employee’s investments is shorter (Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2005). If
temporary workers are hired as specialists for certain tasks for a ﬁxed period (“on-
call”), ﬁrm will not provide training to them (Wallette, 2005). Secondly, ﬁxed-term
workers invest in human capital more, e.g. to obtain particular skills for on-call jobs,
to compensate for lesser ﬁrm investments, to increase the probability of receiving
a permanent job, or to show loyalty towards the employer. Another argument
is put forward by Autor (2001): in order to elicit private information (ability),
ﬁrms oﬀer training for screening purposes and self-selection. Thirdly, theory oﬀers
arguments which ﬁnds there to be no or no deﬁnite inﬂuence of contract type on
investments. This is because employment of ﬁxed-term workers is faced by higher
turnover, workers ﬁnance investments indirectly by lower wages (OECD, 2002, p.
156). Even if ﬁxed-term workers are hired as on-call workers, they may need training
to perform well in their jobs, a situation similar to new workers with permanent
contracts. Of course, investments could also be determined by other factors such as
technical developments instead of the contract type.
Similar to the theoretical literature, there are only few empirical studies on training
of temporary workers. For Germany, Wilkens and Leber (2003) include a dummy
variable for individuals holding a ﬁxed-term contract and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect of ﬁxed-term contracts on training participation.5 Regarding diﬀerent types
of temporary jobs, Wallette (2005) argues for heterogeneous eﬀects for (temporary)
replacement, project, on-call and probation jobs in Sweden. Another important
3 See Leuven (2005) for a survey on theoretical models.
4 Other market imperfections that result in compressed wages are complementary between
general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998) and trade unions
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999).
5 A positive inﬂuence of ﬁxed-term contracts is found by McIntosh (1999) for Germany. This
result could be biased by the inclusion of apprentices.
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result comes from Albert et al. (2005), who isolate the eﬀect of being enrolled in a
ﬁrm that oﬀers training from the eﬀect of being selected to participate in training
within a ﬁrm that oﬀers training. They ﬁnd that workers with ﬁxed-term contracts
are less likely to be employed in “training ﬁrms” and if so, receive less training
compared to permanent workers.
For the analysis of the inﬂuence of ﬁxed-term contracts on training participation,
it is important to know why ﬁrms oﬀer ﬁxed-term contracts alongside permanent
contracts: ﬁrst, if ﬁring costs of permanent contracts are higher than those for
ﬁxed-term contracts, ﬁxed-term contracts can be used to ease adjustment and thus
to lower adjustment costs (Hunt, 2000). Second, ﬁxed-term contracts can be seen
as prolonged probation in order to allow screening (Autor, 2001). Then, low-ability
workers could be layed oﬀ less costly (Boockmann and Hagen, 2005). Third, ﬁxed-
term contracts can induce self-selection of “good” workers (Loh, 1994).
The German legislation on employment contracts is characterised by a high level
of employment protection with respect to permanent contracts,6 whilst the use of
ﬁxed-contracts has gradually been deregulated since 1985. Fixed-term contracts are
legal if employers can either show to have “objective reasons” or if a ﬁxed-term job
is temporary limited. Temporary limited ﬁxed-term contracts can be renewed at
most three times with a maximum length of two years. If objective reasons can be
proven, iterative ﬁxed-term contract spells are legal.
3 Estimation strategy, data, and descriptive sta-
tistics
This paper analyses the eﬀect of worker’s employment contract, i.e. ﬁxed-term
versus permanent contracts, on participation and ﬁnancing of work-related training.
The empirical analysis is accomplished in two steps: ﬁrst, we analyse the eﬀect
on participation in training. In the second step, we examine whether there are
diﬀerences with regard to ﬁnancing work-related training.
3.1 Estimation strategy
When estimating the inﬂuence of contract type on participation in training, it is
necessary to control for potential selection eﬀects. If the occurrence of ﬁxed-term
contracts is not random but rather driven by unobserved factors, then estimation
6 Hunt (2000) notes, that individual and collective dismissals of workers with permanent con-
tracts are costly either in “terms of time, money or procedural complexity”. However, employ-
ment protection for permanent workers was deregulated for small and start-up establishments
(Jahn (2005) and appendix A.1).
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 14/2006 7IWH
without selection correction would produce biased estimators. Previous empiri-
cal studies on training, which controlled for ﬁxed-term contracts, mostly include a
dummy variable for temporary employment into the estimation equation. In contrast
to these studies, we argue that unobservable eﬀects may bias the occurrence of ﬁxed-
term contracts. With detailed information on worker’s and ﬁrm’s characteristics, a
large part of the variation in training can be explained. However, (unobserved) abil-
ity can be correlated to ﬁxed-term contracts because of self-selection (Loh, 1994).
Firms may use ﬁxed-term employment relationships in order to screen their termpo-
rary workers (Autor, 2001). Finally, we can not observe whether temporary workers
are on-call workers which may need less ﬁrm-provided training.
Since both the decision to participate in training and the decision on being employed
on a ﬁxed-term contract are dichotomous, the bivariate probit model (van de Ven
and van Praag, 1981; Maddala, 1983) is an appropriate econometric method. It
consists of two equations: the ﬁrst equation contains the training probability (y1i),
the second is the selection equation for ﬁxed-term contracts (y2i). It is a recursive





















Subscript i denotes the individuals, y∗
1i and y∗
2i are latent variables, and regressors in
vectors x1i and x2i, respectively, include worker’s and ﬁrm’s characteristics. Error
terms ε1i and ε2i are assumed to have the following properties:
E(ε1i|x1i,x2i) = E(ε2i|x1i,x2i) = 0,
V ar(ε1i|x1i,x2i) = V ar(ε2|x1i,x2i) = 1 and
Cov(ε1i,ε2i|x1i,x2i) = ρ.
If the error terms ε1i and ε2i are uncorrelated, i.e. ρ = 0, the two equations can be
estimated separately using the probit model. If ρ  = 0, the separate estimates would
be biased. The bivariate probit model controls for this selection eﬀect.
The model is identiﬁed, if either the error terms of both equations are mutually
independent (ρ = 0) or if each equation contains at least one regressor which is
excluded from the other equation (Maddala, 1983, p. 122). Though most regressors
appear in both equations, there are some regressors that can be excluded from one
equations (see section 3.3).
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3.2 Data
The data used in this study is taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP).7 The GSOEP is a representative longitudinal household dataset with
an overall number of individuals of about 22,000 in 2004. The GSOEP was started
in 1984 and expanded by various “ﬁlling” samples. The questionnaire consists of
information collected annually and supplementary modules which are not collected
in every wave. The latter applies to the module “training” which has been collected
in 1989 (Pischke, 2001; Pannenberg, 1997), 1993, 2000 (Wilkens and Leber, 2003)
and 2004.
The information on work-related training is collected retrospectively for a period of
three years prior to the interview. The questions on training were posed to all re-
spondents aged 16 to 64. The interview sequence is related to work-related training
courses and workshops and explicitly excludes reading of technical literature, and
the attendance at trade fairs and congresses. Respondents which have participated
in at least one workshop or training course are asked about the start date, dura-
tion, goals in detail. Further questions are posed concerning whether the course
was conducted during work hours or leisure, based on self-ﬁnance, who arranged the
training, whether they received ﬁnancial support and by whom, whether the course
was certiﬁed, and whether the contents of training can be applied in other estab-
lishments as well. This information is gathered for the last three training courses
and workshops prior to the interview.8
In order to analyse investments in human capital within employment relationships,
the sample in this study is restricted to all respondents in dependent employment at
the 2004 interview. The estimation sample then includes 8,363 individuals. We use
training data from the 2004 wave of the GSOEP. Taking advantage of the GSOEP’s
panel structure, other variables are taken from the training’s start date.9 It is crucial
to do so because otherwise the current employment status could be the result of past
training which would mean that variables could be biased. For non-participants, we
use data from the 2004 wave. Figure 2 shows the distribution of training start dates
of training participants from the 2004 wave (see appendix A.2).
3.3 Dependent and identifying variables
We use diﬀerent dummy-variables to analyse the inﬂuence of workers’ contracts on
training. The ﬁrst, and most obvious variable for the training equation, is par-
ticipation in work-related training within the three years immediately prior to the
interview. However, the use of this variable may hide two divergent eﬀects: the
7 For a recent documentation of GSOEP, see SOEP Group (2001) or Haisken-DeNew and Frick
(2005).
8 As mentioned by Pischke (2001), the questions on training are related to mostly formal courses.
9 For a similar procedure, see Pischke (2001) and Wilkens and Leber (2003).
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theoretical discussion shows that ﬁrm and temporary workers may have opposing
incentives (not) to invest in a temporary worker’s human capital. Therefore, we
created two variables to explain diﬀerent ﬁnancing patterns: the variable “employer
ﬁnanced training” covers all work-related training within three years immediately
prior to the interview if the training is on-the-job, or if there is ﬁnancial assistance
by the employer.10 To analyse employee-sponsored training, we deﬁned a variable
which includes work-related training if the employee had direct costs related to the
training. Unfortunately, we are not able to measure indirect cost participation, such
as temporary or permanent wage cuts to ﬁnance training.
For identifying purposes, we include the variables “risk aversion” and “working
overtime” in the training equation, but not in the ﬁxed-term contract equation.
Neither theory nor previous empirical studies have found these variables to be able to
explain ﬁxed-term contracts and training, respectively. This procedure is underlayed
by probit regressions in table 3, where the estimates for “risk aversion” and “working
overtime” are insigniﬁcant. To identify the ﬁxed-term contract equation, we use a
dummy variable for employment relationships which have started after January,
2001, where a major change in legislation took place. We argue that this had an
eﬀect on the use of ﬁxed-term contracts, but not on the participation in training.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
On the descriptive level (see table 1 and 2), participation in training shows some
interesting results: while there is only a minor diﬀerence between participation
in training among permanent workers (31.4%) and workers with ﬁxed-term con-
tracts (30.6%), training and ﬁnancing characteristics clearly show diverging pat-
terns. Workers with ﬁxed-term contracts, participating in training, receive their
training more often “oﬀ”-the-job, i.e. not during working hours (23.6% vs. 18.9%).
This pattern is complemented by the ﬁgures of own payments for training: while
permanent workers which participate in training invest 112 Euro, the number rises to
129 Euro among workers with ﬁxed-term contracts (table 2). Unfortunately, there is
no data on what amount the ﬁrm pays for training of workers, both directly in terms
of training costs, or indirectly in terms of temporary loss of wages. We deﬁned two
further variables, employer-ﬁnanced training and employee-ﬁnanced training (see
subsection 3.3). This was necessary to roughly account for “assistance” by ﬁrms,
e.g. through training during working hours. According to this measure, it is 72.8%
of temporary workers which participate in training ﬁnanced (at least partly) by
their employer, whereas 83.9% of permanent workers do the same. In contrast, the
ﬁgures for employee-ﬁnanced training, i.e. if employees paid for training through
direct costs, are 19.7% and 15.4%, respectively. Descriptive statistics on the aims of
training support theoretical considerations on training of termpoary workers: 31.0%
10 We assume that on-the-job training is a kind of “indirect” ﬁnancing by the employer. Costs
are temporary productivity loss or direct training costs.
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of termporary workers with training aim at doing career advancement, whereas it is
only 23.5% among workers with permanent contracts.
Regarding ﬁrms’ and workers’ characteristics and the participation in training in
general, descriptive statistics show that part-time and marginal part-time workers
participate in training clearly less compared to workers with ﬁxed-term or permanent
contracts. Regarding formal qualiﬁcation and skill level in the current job, it is
obvious that low- and medium-skilled blue collar workers, as well as low-skilled
white collar workers receive less training. Whereas especially high-skilled white
collar workers participate more in training.11 The greater share of workers with
training in large ﬁrms can be explained by economies of scale within providing
training.
Similar to the occurence of training, ﬁxed-term contracts are more widespread among
low-skilled blue collar workers, medium- and high-skilled white collar workers as well
as workers with no occupational degree. With respect to ﬁrm characteristics, work-
ers within the agricultural and the service sector are employed on a temporary basis
more often. Due to data restrictions, we are not able to diﬀerentiate between sea-
sonal and non-seasonal ﬁxed-term employment. There are no diﬀerences regarding
ﬁrm size: for small ﬁrms (< 10 employees) it is legal to employ workers on a ﬁxed-
term basis, but at the same time they are not faced by dismissal protection.
4 Estimation results
The main aim of this paper is to analyse the eﬀect of the worker’s type of contract
(ﬁxed-term vs. permanent) on participation and ﬁnancing of training. We apply the
bivariate probit method (see subsection 3.1) in order to regard potential selection
eﬀects. To analyse diﬀerent ﬁnancing patterns of workers and ﬁrms, we use diﬀerent
dependent variables.
4.1 The eﬀect of ﬁxed-term contracts
Within the ﬁrst estimation (table 4, column (1) and (2)), the dependent variable
is a dummy with work-related training participation within the three years imme-
diately prior to the interview, independently of who ﬁnanced the training and at
what time the training took place. Fixed-term employment has a signiﬁcant nega-
tive inﬂuence on participation of training. Among all dummy variables included in
the regression, this variable is the most important determinant for the probability
11 The deﬁnition of high- medium- and low-skilled is taken from Blossfeld (1989). This classiﬁ-
cation, which is used widely in labour market research, stratiﬁes employees into groups which
are homogeneous with respect to their occupational tasks and educational and occupational
qualiﬁcation.
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of receiving training. This ﬁrst evidence suggests that there is indeed an overall
negative inﬂuence of ﬁxed-term contracts on training. Similar, but weaker results
can be found for part-time and casual workers employees.12
The second dependent variable is deﬁned as training within the three years imme-
diately prior to the interview which is either directly ﬁnanced by the employer, or
indirectly ﬁnanced, if training takes place during working hours (“on-the-job”). As
in the ﬁrst model, the workers with ﬁxed-term contracts have a lower probability
of participating in training. This supports the hypothesis that ﬁrms are less willing
to ﬁnance work-related training if workers have ﬁxed-term contracts. Thus, ﬁrms
do not pay lower wages in order to ﬁnance training. However, there are other ar-
guments to explain lower wages of temporary workers, such as speciﬁc investments
like search costs.
In contrast to the dependent variable “employer-sponsored training”, we use
“employee-sponsored training” as the third dependent variable (table 4, column
(5) and (6)). This variable contains training at least partly ﬁnanced by the worker
through direct costs. The eﬀect of this variable is again negative. This result in-
dicates that workers with ﬁxed-term contracts do not compensate for lower ﬁrm
investments.
Of course, since we are not able to observe whether the ﬁrm pays lower wages to
ﬁnance investments in human capital, we can not determine the actual costs related
to training. Thus, distinguishing between employer-, employee- and shared-ﬁnancing
remains imprecise.
4.2 Selection eﬀects
This study explicitly uses a selection correction mechanism, namely the bivariate
probit model. Selection eﬀects may arise because the decision to participate in
training, as well as the decision whether to have a ﬁxed-term contract may not be
random, but rather might be determined by unobservable factors, such as ability.
The correlation term ρ = Cov(ε1i,ε2i|x1i,x2i) indicates whether selection correction
is appropriate. If ρ = 0, estimating single-equation probit is suﬃcient. Within all
models, we ﬁnd correlation terms which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
This result has two implications: ﬁrstly, as proposed by theoretical models
(Loh, 1994; Autor, 2001), there are selection eﬀects. Secondly, previous results
of studies neglecting this relationship should be interpreted carefully with respect
to the inﬂuence of contract type.




The results of the other explaining variables are similar to those found in previous
studies13 and are similar across the estimated models.14 Firstly, age has a positive
inﬂuence, squared age a negative one. This result can be interpreted with diminish-
ing information asymmetries of the ﬁrm towards the employee but ot also depends
on the worker’s knowledge about his own ability, and thus about expected returns
from training. Job tenure within current ﬁrms has a signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence,
and can be explained by investments undertaken throughout the beginning of the
employment relationship. In accordance with human capital theory, high risk aver-
sion lowers the probability of participation in training. However, the strength is
surprising as risk aversion should aﬀect only the worker’s investments. Working
overtime regularly has a positive impact on training participation. Gerﬁn, Leu and
Nyﬀeler (2003) explain this as a positive signal towards the employer. Regarding
ﬁrm size, it is argued that larger ﬁrms yield returns to scale in providing training
(Zwick, 2005). Within the estimation of training in general, and employer-sponsored
training, this result holds and workers in larger ﬁrms indeed participate in training
more, in comparison to smaller ﬁrms. Results for skill groups are very clear: work-
ers in medium- and high-skilled jobs participate in training more (see also Pischke
(2001), B¨ uchel and Pannenberg (2004), and Wilkens and Leber (2003)). This can be
due to higher returns from investments, as they are aware of their ability, or because
their skills complement capital investments, such as investments in information and
communication technologies (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987).
Regarding the probability of being employed on a ﬁxed-term contract, the results
are quite similar across the estimated models: age as well as job tenure within the
current ﬁrm has a negative inﬂuence. This result is not surprising because ﬁxed-term
contracts are either terminated after the contract duration or converted to perma-
nent contracts.15 Additionally, younger workers are more faced with employment
relationships based on ﬁxed-term contracts.16 Similar, employment relationships
that started after January 2001 have a higher probability of being temporary. Re-
garding ﬁrm size, the eﬀect can be observed, that larger ﬁrms rather use ﬁxed-term
contracts. This result can be explained by the fact that small ﬁrms are not bound
to legal dismissal protection.
13 See Pischke (2001) and B¨ uchel and Pannenberg (2004) for an comprehensive overview on
training in Germany.
14 Pischke (2001) also ﬁnds that similar results for employer-sponsored, as well as for training
participation in general applies.
15 See ﬁgure 3 for duration of employment relationships.
16 However, other studies ﬁnd negative inﬂuence of age on the occurence of ﬁxed-term contracts
(Boockmann and Hagen, 2005, for men).
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5 Conclusions
This study dealt with the eﬀect of ﬁxed-term contracts on participation and ﬁnanc-
ing of work-related training. In order to measure the eﬀect accurately, we used a
recursive simultaneous-equation model to take selection eﬀects into account.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) from 1997 to 2004,
we found that holding a ﬁxed-term contract lowers the probability of participating
in work-related training. These results are in line with the previous literature on the
eﬀects of ﬁxed-term contracts on work-related training (Albert et al., 2005; Wallette,
2005). This result supports the argument that ﬁrms are averse to invest in human
capital of temporary workers due to their shorter job tenure.
In addition to the previous studies on the eﬀect of ﬁxed-term contracts on training
participation, we addressed the question whether there are divergent investment
patterns between employer and employee with respect to contract type. However,
the eﬀect of ﬁxed-term contracts on employer-sponsored, as well as on employee-
sponsored training, is negative. Therefore, we conclude that ﬁxed-term workers
do not compensate for low ﬁrm investments through own investments in human
capital. These results stand in contrast with the argument that temporary workers
are on-call workers with special skills which are developed or maintained by own
investments.
Applying the bivariate probit method, we found that selection correction is an ap-
propriate method, and that probit estimation thus yields biased estimates when
estimating the eﬀect of ﬁxed-term contracts on training participation.
These results have important implications for labour market policy. Of course,
when employment protection of permanent workers is high, ﬁxed-term contracts al-
low the ﬁrms more ﬂexibility (Hagen, 2003), or can be used as a sorting mechanism
(Boockmann and Hagen, 2005). However, if workers are employed on a ﬁxed-term
basis, repeated temporary employment can explain long-term negative eﬀects. Tem-
porary work gains importance as an alternative to permanent employment and thus
may have severe inﬂuence on the stock of human capital.
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A Appendix
A.1 Institutional Background for Germany
In Germany, workers can be dismissed only if the employer shows that there are
either operational reasons or reasons that are caused by “the person or the person’s
behaviour” (§2 (2) Employment Protection Act, KSchG). If dismissal is caused by
operational reasons, the employer has to select a worker from a group of compara-
ble workers for whom dismissal will have the least eﬀect (“Sozialauswahl”). Then,
periods of notice range from one to twenty month, depending on job tenure and age
(§622 (2) German Civil Code, BGB). Dismissed workers are entitled to severance
payments if the dismissal is unfair (§9 (1) KSchG), e.g. if the objective reasons have
turned out to be incorrect. Severance payments depend on age, job tenure, and
previous earnings. In addition, employment protection on permanent contracts is
regulated by the Works Constitution Act (BetrVG), by decisions of labour courts,
and may depend on collective agreements. There are exceptions to dismissal pro-
tection for small establishments as well as newly founded ﬁrms.
Until the ﬁrst major deregulation of ﬁxed-term contracts in 1985, ﬁxed-term con-
tracts were allowed if the employer could satisfactorily show to have “objective rea-
sons” (§14 (1) Part-time Work and Fixed-term Contracts Act, TzBfG). The main
objective reasons are seasonal ﬂuctuations or temporarily higher labour demand,
temporary replacement, carrying out special tasks, and employment as probation.
If objective reasons can be proven, iterative ﬁxed-term contract spells are legally
allowed. In addition to ﬁxed-term contracts with objective reasons, ﬁxed-term con-
tracts can be applied if they are temporarily limited (“kalenderm¨ aßige Befristung”,
§14 (2) TzBfG). Then, ﬁxed-term contracts are limited to at most three renewals
within the maximum length of two years.
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A.2 Tables and ﬁgures
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women: >35h/w
Source: Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Mikrozensus.IWH
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Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, own calculations.





























Graphs by type of employment relationship












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Probit estimatesa
Dependent variable training FTC








age (squared) -.001 .001
(.0001) (.0002)
job tenure -.032 -.164
(.006) (.008)






East Germany .055 .231
(.037) (.054)
ﬁrm size: 20-199 empl. .005 .312
(.046) (.066)
ﬁrm size: 200-1999 empl. .189 .437
(.049) (.074)
ﬁrm size: ≥ 2000 empl. .294 .463
(.049) (.076)
hired after January, 2001 -.410 —
(.053)
risk aversionb — .013
(.011)
working overtime — -.009
(.007)








Source: GSOEP 1996-2004. For the construction of
the dataset, see section 3.2.
a The regression sample is unweighted. Table
presents coeﬃcients, and standard errors in paran-
theses.
b Risk aversion is 0 if an indiviudal has high risk
aversion and 10 for low risk aversion.IWH
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Table 4: Bivariate probit estimatesa
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent training ﬁxed-term employer-sponsored ﬁxed-term employee-sponsored ﬁxed-term
variables contracts training contract training contract
ﬁxed-term contract -1.098 — -1.150 — -.851 —
(.117) (.126) (.271)
part-time -.156 .128 -.162 .116 -.134 .107
(.045) (.065) (.047) (.065) (.072) (.066)
casual work -.540 .385 -.740 .365 -.410 .349
(.103) (.095) (.131) (.095) (.185) (.096)
age .052 -.076 .051 -.077 .026 -.082
(.012) (.015) (.012) (.015) (.021) (.016)
age (squared) -.0008 .0008 -.0008 .0008 -.0005 .0009
(.0001) (.0002) (.0001) (.0002) (.0003) (.0002)
job tenure -.026 -.101 -.020 -.105 -.033 -.108
(.006) (.01) (.007) (.01) (.014) (.01)
job tenure (squared) .0006 .002 .0005 .002 .0008 .002
(.0002) (.0003) (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
male .064 .096 .134 .089 -.040 .077
(.038) (.056) (.039) (.056) (.061) (.057)
foreign -.331 .056 -.313 .055 -.424 .080
(.066) (.09) (.069) (.09) (.147) (.091)
East Germany .079 .252 .048 .248 .155 .248
(.037) (.053) (.038) (.053) (.057) (.054)
risk aversionb .040 — .041 — .022 —
(.007) (.007) (.012)
working overtime .030 — .025 — .025 —
(.004) (.004) (.006)
Blue collar: low-skilled -.212 .285 -.271 .300 -.024 .286
(.076) (.105) (.081) (.105) (.141) (.106)
Blue collar: medium-sk. .077 .064 .061 .052 .051 .051
(.055) (.087) (.057) (.087) (.102) (.089)
Blue collar: high-sk. .661 .127 .604 .124 .212 .097
(.072) (.121) (.074) (.124) (.126) (.125)
White collar: medium-sk. .387 -.082 .334 -.092 .180 -.085
(.046) (.071) (.048) (.071) (.083) (.072)
White collar: high-sk. .527 .368 .448 .369 .524 .360
(.057) (.083) (.058) (.083) (.091) (.085)
ﬁrm size: 20-199 empl. .072 .317 .131 .313 -.091 .319
(.045) (.065) (.048) (.065) (.077) (.067)
ﬁrm size: 200-1999 empl. .278 .426 .359 .422 .025 .438
(.049) (.074) (.051) (.074) (.084) (.075)
ﬁrm size: ≥ 2000 empl. .392 .482 .481 .475 .074 .465
(.049) (.075) (.051) (.074) (.084) (.076)
hired after January, 2001 — .643 — .619 — .578
(.066) (.066) (.069)
— sector dummies are included —
constant -1.818 -.314 -2.019 -.266 -2.010 -.142
(.251) (.312) (.268) (.312) (.461) (.316)
ˆ ρ .691 .712 .489
(.102) (.117) (.212)
Observations 8363 8363 8363
log likelihood -6255.71 -5909.62 -3175.38
χ2 2439.46 2308.32 1333.38
(p-value) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Source: GSOEP 1996-2004. For the construction of the dataset, see section 3.2.
a The regression sample is unweighted. The table presents coeﬃcients, and standard errors in parantheses.
b Risk aversion is 0 if an indiviudal has high risk aversion and 10 for low risk aversion.